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Hunt’s (1972) observation of asymmetric strategies pursued by strategic groups of firms in the 
U.S. white goods industry more than three decades ago sparked an explosion of industry and 
cross-industry studies. Departing somewhat from the prevailing industrial organization logic of 
that time, strategic groups—clusters of firms pursuing similar competitive strategies (Porter, 
1980)—represent different strategic positions for different firms within a single industry. The 
different industry positions are separated by mobility barriers with the underlying assumption 
that industry success is primarily derived from intra-industry structure. 
In the 1990s, researchers proposed the resource based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1995; Barney, 1997, 2001), suggesting that firms can be viewed as a collection of 
resources, skills and routines, the application of which results in positions of sustainable 
competitive advantage. This perspective assumes that a firm’s unique set of resources and skills 
protects it from imitation and provides the base for accumulation of superior profits through 
differentiation. Thus, success is assumed not to be a function of intra-industry structure, but 
rather one of an effective application of accumulated resources. 
Both strategic group theory and the resource based perspective attempt to explain diversity 
within industries. In one respect, the resource based theory adopts a pre-strategy position, 
providing an inventory of firm resources and the routines that convert them into effective 
strategies. In contrast, strategic group theory adopts a post-strategy position, offering a taxonomy 
of strategies employed by firms, where individual firms are classified into strategic groups 
through comparison of past strategic investments. 
Although there are significant differences between these competing perspectives philosophically, 
this paper also explores the similarities between strategic group theory and the resource based 
view. The idea of the “corporate genome” (Aurik, Gillis, and Willen, 2002; Leask, 2002) is 
proposed as a model that may improve our understanding of competitive dynamics and provide a 
link between what firms are—the resource based view—and how firms employ their resources in 
the market via strategic group dynamics. 
Development of Strategic Group Theory 
Within Bain (1968) and Mason’s (1939) structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm of 
industrial organization (IO) economics, profitability emanates from industry structure. Industry 
factors are viewed as the primary influences on organizational performance (Barney, 1986). 
Early strategy researchers challenged the IO perspective, noting its inability to explain large 
performance variances within a single industry (Ghemawat, 2002). As a result, the strategic 
group level of analysis was proposed as a compromise between the deterministic, industry level 
of analysis developed by IO economics and the organizational level of analysis studied by 
strategic management researchers (Hergert, 1983; Porter, 1981). Strategic groups describe 
apparent clusters of businesses that exhibit similar or homogeneous behavior within a somewhat 
heterogeneous industry environment (Fiegenbaum; McGee, and Thomas, 1988; Nouthoofd and 
Heene, 1997). Although both IO and strategic group theory emphasize groups of firms, the latter 
accounts for performance variations within industries by dissecting industries and moving closer 
to the firm level of analysis. 
Hunt’s (1972) observation of asymmetric strategies pursued by strategic groups challenged the 
prevailing IO paradigm. Hunt assumed that all firms pursued an optimal strategy for the industry 
and that performance differences between firms were solely a function of the relative application 
of scale. This link to the SCP paradigm remains today and underpins the twin pillars of theory 
that form the theoretical base of the strategic group concept, mobility barriers and intra-industry 
competition. 
Mobility barrier theory (Caves and Porter, 1977), derives from Bain’s (1968) notion of entry 
barriers, proposing that persistent performance differences between strategic groups may result 
from intra-industry barriers that prevent ease of movement between adjacent market positions 
and restrict erosion of firm advantages through competition or imitation. Thus, strategic groups 
are represented as analogous to “walled medieval cities” where the cumulative collective 
activities of their member firms act as barriers to access. 
Movement between groups, therefore, can occur only after the elapse of considerable time or 
expense necessary in order to develop the required skills or resources to vault the barrier. Thus, 
firms enter the industry via the least protected group and subsequently follow an evolutionary 
path to more profitable positions staying within each group long enough to accumulate the 
required resources, experience and knowledge for successful assault on the next most attractive 
position. Here, the height of mobility barrier equates to the distance between groups and barrier 
height and group inaccessibility are proportional to group average profitability (Caves and 
Porter, 1977). 
All mobility barriers are not equal however, because some operational advantages such as sales-
force size or advertising are largely a function of expenditure. Conversely, patents, for example, 
are the result of accumulated experience, knowledge and the application of leading edge research 
that may take a very long time to understand, let alone duplicate. Product positions, most 
ultimately derived from patents represent the accumulated exercise of experience, leading edge 
research and both tacit and explicit sales and marketing investments and routines. Product 
positions therefore represent one of the least pliable of mobility barriers that ultimately 
determine the competitive arenas within which the company can compete. Strategy provides the 
link between the application of resource and performance; in turn, products are the result of the 
effective combination of resources to meet customer needs. 
Strategic groups cannot exist without mobility barriers; in their absence, differential positions 
would soon be competed away. However, movement within an industry is not restricted solely 
by mobility barriers. Individual firms are also constrained by their resource base and the legacy 
of past investments. These isolating mechanisms represent firm specific commitments (i.e., 
resources) that restrict the individual firm’s degrees of strategic freedom and thus may prevent a 
firm from switching from one strategy to another (Rumelt, 1984). Within an individual strategic 
group, firms may vary in their ability to change strategy and respond to a given opportunity. 
Some may form a stable inner group and “stick to the knitting” while an outer group of firms 
possessing more freedom of movement may move relatively easily to an adjacent group should 
industry conditions warrant it. This may explain the observation that within longitudinal strategic 
group studies (Cool, 1985; Cool and Schendel, 1987; Martens, 1988; Fiegenbaum et al., 1990; 
Bogner, 1991), some firms remain stable core members of groups over time while others may 
switch between groups several times during the duration of a study. 
The theory of intra-industry competition (Porter 1976, 1979) forms the second pillar of strategic 
group theory. As such, strategic group membership implies a common perspective of “how to 
compete.” When combined with common market interests such as serving a common customer, 
this perspective is likely to foster the building of co-operative interests through mechanisms such 
as collusion. This situation is enhanced if the firms involved are similarly matched in size. In 
contrast, if there is considerable competitive diversity, then internecine warfare is the likely 
outcome and profits erode through more intense competition. Thus, Porter’s theory proposes two 
key axes, the first, the degree of market inter-dependence and the second, the degree of similarity 
between strategies employed. Relative size, within a given market, determines the degree to 
which firms perceive each other as rivals. 
A distinct stream of empirical research has supported the notion of strategic groups. Linkages 
between strategic group and firm performance have been identified in the brewing (Hatten and 
Schendel, 1977; Hatten, Schendel, and Cooper, 1978), chemical process (Newman, 1973), 
consumer goods (Porter, 1973), paints and allied products (Dess and Davis, 1984), industrial 
products (Hambrick, 1983), U.S. insurance (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990), and retail mail-
order (Parnell and Wright, 1993) industries, among others. However, not all studies have 
supported a strong relationship between strategic group membership and performance (McGee 
and Thomas, 1986, 1992). Ketchen and associates’ (1997) meta-analysis found that strategic 
group membership explained only about eight percent of firm performance. Katobe and Duhan 
(1993) identified three strategy clusters among Japanese businesses—brand skeptics, mavericks, 
and true believers—and found that membership in one of the groups was not a significant 
predictor of performance. Rather, the link between strategy and performance appears to be 
moderated by organization situational variables such as the degree of emphasis on manufacturing 
and profitability (Davis and Schul, 1993; Zahra, 1993). 
Support for the universal application of strategic groups has been mixed, however. Recent work 
in the field has addressed both methodological and theoretical concerns. For example, Dranove, 
Peteraf, and Shanley (1998) suggested that strategic groups must illustrate the presence of 
distinct intra-group effects that are separate and distinct from either industry effects or individual 
firm effects. This approach builds on the twin pillars, strengthening the idea of mobility barriers 
to represent some degree of group identity where firms will move in concert and the actions of 
the group will affect a change in actions of individual member firms. Group reputation through 
joint advertising and public relations exercises may therefore enhance group differentiation and 
lead to group effects. Strongly intertwined markets will similarly encourage collusion or other 
co-operative effects that may affect group performance. 
Emergence of Resource Based Theory 
Dissatisfaction with the multiple firm orientation inherent in strategic group analysis may have 
been the primary impetus for a renewed interest in firm resources, not strategic group 
membership, as the foundation for firm strategy (Barney, 1991; Collis, 1991; Grant, 1991). The 
resulting paradigm, resource based theory, drew from the earlier work of Penrose (1959) and 
Wernerfelt (1984) and emphasized unique firm competencies and resources in strategy 
formulation, implementation, and performance. A firm’s resources may include physical capital 
resources (technology, plant, equipment, geographic location, access to raw materials), human 
capital resources (training, experience, judgment, intelligence, relationships, insights, and overall 
quality of managers and employees), and organizational capital resources (planning, controlling, 
and organizing systems). 
The nature of competitive advantage began to take renewed prominence within the resource 
based perspective, whereby competitive advantage occurs when a firm is implementing a value 
creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors 
(Peteraf, 1993). Sustained competitive advantage exists when competitors are unable to duplicate 
the benefits of the strategy (Barney, 1991). 
Resource based proponents have studied such firm-level issues as transaction costs (Camerer and 
Vepsalainen, 1988), economies of scope, and organizational culture (Barney, 1991; Fiol, 1991). 
Key business-level issues include the analysis of competitive imitation (Rumelt, 1984), 
informational asymmetries (Barney, 1986), causal ambiguities (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990), and 
the process of resource accumulation (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
Initially, resource based theory was postulated as an alternative perspective to strategic group 
theory, challenging three key assumptions of the industrial organization foundation. First, IO 
assumes that firm profitability is primarily a function of industry profitability. Although this 
view recognizes the roles played by a variety of industry-level factors such as entry and exit 
barriers, it does not account for a firm’s ability to redefine an industry or substantially influence 
its structure, even to the extent that it has no direct competitors. Resource based theorists contend 
that the ability of a firm to develop and utilize valuable resources is the primary determinant of 
its performance. 
Second, resource based theory challenged the very existence of strategic groups. According to IO 
theory, just as industries may be identified based on similarities shared by its members, strategic 
groups within the industry can be defined based on strategic commonalties shared by their 
members. By maintaining a group level of analysis within the industry, IO researchers seek to 
identify appropriate strategies by comparing the performance levels of the strategic groups. In 
contrast, resource based theorists argue that emphasizing the strategic group level of analysis de-
emphasizes the uniqueness of businesses in a given industry. 
Third, IO theorists contend that information is perfect in the long run, and that any short-run 
heterogeneity among businesses within an industry will be eliminated as competitors purchase 
valuable resources at the strategic factor markets (Barney, 1991). Recognizing that all firms have 
common access to a common body of resources, the IO approach does not seek to measure 
intangible resources believed to be transitory. 
In contrast, the resource based perspective recognizes that businesses within an industry or 
strategic group may control heterogeneous resources, and that heterogeneity may be sustained 
over time. Resource based theorists contend that firm resources include all assets, capabilities, 
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, and knowledge controlled by a firm—
many of which may be intangible and/or difficult to measure—that enable it to conceive of and 
implement successful strategies. To the resource based theorist, ignoring firm-specific resources 
believed to be transitory so that researchers can incorporate a static approach to investigating 
firm profitability substantially reduces the precision of the analysis and is therefore unjustified. 
However, it should be noted that accepting the transitory nature of resources that lead to 
competitive advantage further complicates the research process for the resource based theorist 
(Dess, Gupta, Hennart, and Hill, 1995; Feurer and Chaharbaghi, 1994; Robins and Wiersema, 
1995). 
Criticism of strategic groups have not been limited to theoretical concerns. Many resource based 
theorists have questioned the predominant use of cluster analysis in many of the early strategic 
group studies (Cool and Schendel, 1988; Derajtys, Chrisman, and Bauerschmidt, 1993; Ketchen 
and Shook, 1996; Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988). It has been argued that strategic groups—at 
least in some cases—may be merely the artifacts of the algorithms utilized to generate clusters 
(Barney and Hoskisson, 1990). The primary weakness of cluster analysis is that it concentrates 
on similarities and does not account for strategy differences. Strictly interpreted, resource based 
theory would argue that forcing classifications based on any limited sets of generic strategies is 
inconsistent with an emphasis on resources, this approach provides a compromise that allows for 
unique strategy assignments while enabling tests of the strategy-performance linkage. Yet firms 
within a given industry face similar problems, identify similar opportunities, utilise common 
technology and mimic the actions of “reference firms.” Despite the unique constituents of the 
resource base, the application of such resources may emerge in terms of effectively similar 
strategies. 
Other resource based theories have noted that an important element of competitive advantage 
derives from the tacit elements of strategy that traditional strategic group analysis fails to 
capture. This is because these factors are by their nature learned and are not readily discernible in 
company accounts although some aspects may be expressed within EVA [Economic Value 
Added] or MVA [Market Value Added] statements. For example, what proportion of added 
value stems from learned responses, experience and training of the workforce? Elements that 
may underpin the differences in strategy implementation referenced to by Porter (Porter, 1980), 
but that are not easily measured are absent from traditional strategic group studies. However, by 
including such considerations the interpretation of strategic groups may be rendered more 
accurate. The strategies of firms ultimately reflect the underlying skills and resources of the firm 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1997), and any classification of strategy by strategic grouping should 
endeavour to reflect this. 
Integrating the Perspectives 
Although the strategic group and resource based perspectives have been juxtaposed in most 
studies, three key linkages between the two perspectives have been identified and are elaborated 
herein. First, as aforementioned, strategic group theory is underpinned and inextricably linked 
with the concept of mobility barriers. Here, the link to resource based theory is clearly apparent 
as rare, inimitable resources, such as patents, appear to be a key characteristic of difficult-to-
cross mobility barriers. 
Second, the theory of intra-industry competition requires that firms address intertwined markets 
(Porter, 1979). Firms employing the same technologies with similar resource bases in terms of 
assets and knowledge are likely to derive similar strategies and develop similar views regarding 
market attractiveness. This observation is not new, however. In their study of the Scottish 
Knitwear industry, Porac and associates (1989) introduced the term “primary competitive group” 
to delineate firms whose managers tend to perceive each other as rivals. 
Following this logic, rivalry is based broadly upon the technological base that firms employ and 
more specifically upon the degree to which products of rival firms are direct substitutes. 
Managers’ cognitive groups can be identified where common experiences, available market 
information and past competitive dynamics all contribute to common perceptions of “how to 
compete” in a given industry. Porac and associates (1989) suggested that common resource base, 
similar experience and common problems lead to a similar set of strategies. The connection 
between strategic groups and the resource based view is clear with cognitive groups representing 
a classification of intended strategies, whereas strategic groups represent similarities in realized 
strategy. 
A third link between the two perspectives can be seen in a study of intra-industry dynamics in 
the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Bogner (1991) proposed that “competitive groups” represent a 
more inclusive grouping that adds to strategic groups the product of past experience, routines and 
accumulated resources that shape member firms “degree of freedom” to shift position and move 
to an adjacent group. Thus, past experience constrains a firm’s ability to change strategy, a link 
to the core competence core rigidity theory (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
Strategic investments represent the core of strategic group formation, whereby firms making 
similar investments develop similar but not identical stocks of competitive responses (Bogner, 
Mahoney, and Thomas, 1998). The link between investment decisions and strategic group 
membership is clearly demonstrated by Cool’s (1985) study of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry. 
Fifteen variables were selected to represent scale, scope and resource commitments in an effort 
to accurately portray strategic choice within the Pharmaceutical industry. Links supported by 
cognitive studies (Reger, 1988; Porac et al., 1989; Voyer, 1993), conclude that managers 
construct a mental model on “how to compete” within a given industry and that when faced with 
a set of similar resource combinations, similar problems and similar objectives some 
convergence of strategies is likely to arise. Such mental models like resource stocks and flows 
will change over time and may be further influenced by learning and the imitation of competitor 
responses that may lead to further convergence. Thus, through the pursuit of similar customers 
and opportunities in similar ways, firms coalesce into strategic groups. 
However, strategies measured by cognitive studies reflect intended strategies. Just as the 
resource based perspective identifies the resource stocks available for selection in the pursuit of 
goals, the intended strategy describes the perceptions of managers about what choices they 
pursue. Hence, both perspectives support and inform strategic group analysis about what occurs 
before implementation. In contrast, strategic groups measure realized strategy, the product of 
past not intended investment decisions. 
In sum, it is suggested that the resource based view enriches and populates strategic group 
analysis. Whereas the IO assumptions within strategic group theory consider performance largely 
to derive via collusion, the resource perspective recognises the entrepreneurial nature of 
revolutionary change (Schumpeter, 1934), and the role played by valuable rare resources 
(Barney, 1997). A firm’s product or service line also links the two perspectives, as elaborated in 
the following section. 
Product Lines and the Corporate Genome Model 
If one accepts that strategy represents how the company plans to achieve its objectives and that a 
primary element of the company’s resource base is the products or services that it markets, then a 
natural link between the strategic group concept and the resource based perspective must be the 
company’s product range. Increasingly however, company direction is influenced not only by 
internal factors of competitive advantage but also by how companies are perceived by investors. 
Here, expectations drive corporate management (Dobbs and Koller, 1998). 
These expectations often depend on three factors, the first of which is expected future 
performance, a function of past sales and projected profit growth. Second, the expectation of 
future cash flows from new products is based on company presentations to investors and the 
performance of similar currently marketed products. Finally, future growth is generally expected 
to at least equal past growth leading to a constantly raised expectation of future performance 
which cannot be sustained indefinitely. 
The expectation of future success hinges increasingly upon a company’s product portfolio, both 
present and future. Shareholder expectations shape the actions of the company’s top management 
team. Here, the company’s product portfolio can be portrayed as analogous to the human 
“genome”—the totality of an organism’s genetic material—where products represent individual 
genes, each serving as a focus of a set of company activities.1 This idea can be extended to the 
notion of a “corporate genome.” The U.K. pharmaceutical industry provides an excellent 
illustration of this phenomenon because it is product-driven (George and Pearson, 2002) and 
knowledge-based (Henderson and Cockburn, 1995), featuring long time scales and established 
research routines (Prentice et al., 1988) and a sustained record of high earnings (Bernheim, 
2000). It is interesting to note that this high performing industry also provides a paradox because 
in contrast to the knowledge heterogeneity predicted by the resource based view (Barney, 1991). 
This knowledge intensive industry actively publishes its results in exchange for patents, the key 
mobility barrier that protects future company revenues. 
The industry is characterised by substantial spillovers of knowledge and similar research can 
lead to related but significantly different outcomes (Henderson and Cockburn 1995: p. 484). 
To the degree that investments in research lay the groundwork for several, related innovations, or 
that success in one area increases the market for all innovation in that area, payoffs across firms 
may be positively correlated (Henderson and Cockburn 1995: p. 488). 
Thus, firm innovation contributes to the pool of industry knowledge but the ability to take 
advantage of that knowledge will hinge strongly upon the core competence of the firm 
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). 
The main industry driver is research productivity, the ability to consistently deliver innovations 
in order to satisfy unmet medical need (George and Pearson 2002). Here, risk is significant with 
only 23 percent of compounds entering clinical trials, the point of greatest R&D expenditure, 
reach the market (Henderson and Cockburn, 1995: p. 485). Pharmaceutical industry leadership 
means mastering a very expensive game of trial and error (George and Pearson, 2002). 
Once launched, company results are heavily skewed with a few blockbuster products scooping a 
disproportionate share of industry revenues. A product that achieves top decile performance may 
be expected to contribute four times more sales than a second decile performer and twenty times 
more sales than a median performing product (Prentice et al., 1988: p. 201). Thus, industry 
position is skewed by a few blockbuster products and one such product can transform and shape 
a company, e.g. Smith Kline French with cimetidine, Glaxo with ranitidine and Astra with 
omeprazole. The presence of such a dominant product within the company’s portfolio can dictate 
managements’ priorities, allocation of resources and views on innovation right up to patent 
expiry. 
In pharmaceutical markets, revenue from a product is typically highest immediately prior to 
patent expiry when with the availability of low priced generics branded product sales decline 
drastically. It is not uncommon for sales to fall by up to 80 percent in the first twelve months. 
Until patent expiry, a firm’s lead product is its top priority therefore old products within “the 
genome” may exert strong influence and detract from new introductions. Past successes may 
therefore have become core rigidities by restricting progress and diverting attention and funding 
away from potential new products right up until their demise (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Table 1 
illustrates how dependent the U.K. top 10 pharmaceutical companies were on older products in 
1999, with the bulk of most companies sales facing imminent patent expiry. 
Table 1.  
Product Portfolio Age Profile Top 10 U.K. Corporations 
Years from Launch 
 
AZ 
 
GW 
 
MSD 
 
AHP 
 
SKB 
 
Pfizer 
 
Novartis 
 
Lilly 
 
WL 
 
 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 
<2 Yrs 0.8 1.9 5.7 0.5 0.4 8.1 0.3 1.4 0.9 
3–5 Yrs 7.1 1.6 16.6 21.8 2.6 0.0 27.1 20.7 61.5 
Years from Launch 
 
AZ 
 
GW 
 
MSD 
 
AHP 
 
SKB 
 
Pfizer 
 
Novartis 
 
Lilly 
 
WL 
 
 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 
6–9 Yrs 1.9 29.6 5.2 48.2 46.9 0.7 21.2 4.7 20.4 
10–13 Yrs 63.9 20.5 45.9 7.5 6.2 87.0 9.8 55.4 7.0 
14 Yrs + 26.3 46.3 26.7 21.9 43.9 4.2 41.6 17.8 10.2 
          
% of Sales <5 Yrs Old 7.9 3.6 22.3 22.4 3.0 8.1 27.3 22.1 62.4 
% of Sales 7–9 Yrs Old 1.9 29.6 5.2 48.2 46.9 0.7 21.2 4.7 20.4 
% of Sales >10 Yrs 90.2 66.8 72.6 29.4 50.1 91.2 51.4 73.2 17.2 
Source: IMS BPI Data MAT, 1999 
 
 
A particularly striking, but not atypical, example is provided by Zantac, which in 1994 had three 
years to patent expiry, but represented over 70 percent of company sales and was Glaxo’s 
number one priority. Despite imminent patent expiry, the company was focused more on Zantac 
than on new product introductions. The hostile acquisition of Wellcome in 1995 was generally 
perceived as a mechanism to dilute the effect of Zantac and meet shareholders’ future earnings 
expectations. This set of competitive dynamics can be used to illustrate the model for the 
corporate genome. 
Table 2 illustrates the corporate genome of some prominent U.K. pharmaceutical companies. 
Each company is active in a number of therapy areas or product groups. Each therapy area 
consists of an area of treatment for example cardiovascular, respiratory and dermatology are all 
therapy areas. Within the IMS (International Medical Systems) coding system there are 16 
therapy areas each one relating to a specific body system. Each therapy area then can be divided 
further into sub-therapy areas that represent individual classes of treatments (e.g., A2B refers to 
anti-ulcerant products). Hence, the 16 broad IMS therapy areas break down into 277 sub-therapy 
areas. It is at this sub-therapy level that product substitution, the true locus of competition within 
pharmaceuticals, occurs. 
Table 2.  
The Corporate Genome’s of Selected Pharmaceutical Manufacturers in 1994 
Astra Allen & Hanbury Glaxo Beecham 
Astra Allen & Hanbury Glaxo Beecham 
A2B R1A A2B A3F 
B3A R1A A4A B6A 
C1B R3A C5A D6A 
C1B R3A C7A J1C 
C1B R3A D1A J1C 
C1B R3A D7A J1C 
C1B R3D D7A J1C 
C1E R3D D7A J1C 
C1E R3D D7A J1H 
C5A R3D D7A J1L 
C7A R3F D7A J1L 
C7B R6A D7B J1L 
D4A  D7B R1A 
J5A  D7B  
N1B  D7B  
N1B  H2A  
N1B  H2A  
N1B  H2A  
N1B  J1D  
N1B  J1D  
N5A  J1D  
N5B  J1D  
R1A  J7B  
R3A  N2C  
R3A  S1K  
R3B    
Astra Allen & Hanbury Glaxo Beecham 
R3D    
T2X    
Source: IMS BPI Data MAT, 1999 
 
 
The operational decisions relating to pharmaceutical products by their nature follow a path 
dependency. The therapeutic indication determines customer group and market. The market 
segment chosen ultimately leads to appropriate customer priorities. Companies may evolve new 
areas of research over time or continue to focus on past priorities, but past successes may tend to 
skew views and hence acceptance of new products. Concerns of cannibalisation may cause 
companies to abort or delay launch of promising new compounds. In effect, today’s core 
capabilities act as tomorrow’s core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
Evolving into new areas presents a problem primarily due to the critical mass of knowledge 
required. Hence, the probability of accruing projects complementary to past successes or areas of 
market understanding is high. Firms seeking licences for new products tend to select companies 
with an established track record in that field, reinforcing the trend for companies to build on 
existing market franchises. The more advanced a company is within a field, the more difficult it 
becomes to change tracks. A geological analysis illustrates this point: Two streams may start 
from the same point on a hillside but moving downhill they gain momentum being deflected by 
differing topographies and cutting deeper into the soil. After a while their paths are so entrenched 
that crossing from one path to another is virtually impossible. 
Within companies, research routines become established and enmeshed within the context of 
current markets and research priorities. Path dependency conditions the organisation to follow 
established proven routines, established lines of research activity (Nelson and Winter, 1982). To 
move from such pathways into completely new areas requires building a competence of new 
science and achievement of critical mass. Given the knowledge asymmetries that exist between 
companies such a move requires massive investment and the elapse of considerable time to build 
a competitive leading edge capability in a new product area, hence the attraction of acquisition as 
a growth option. 
The merger between Pharmacia & Upjohn and Monsanto created extraordinary strength in the 
inflammation segment. Pharmacia & Upjohn made a conscious decision in 1997 to exit 
inflammation as a therapeutic area because of the lack of new product introductions. With 
Monsanto added to the organization, however, the Cox-2 platform that came from Searle can be 
leveraged and the new organization has the talent necessary to sustain and expand Pharmacia’s 
global leadership in the area of inflammation (George and Pearson, 2002). 
Interestingly, with the acquisition of a new company the corporate genome may become diluted 
and the likelihood of conflicting priorities may increase. This may explain in part why some 
companies become less effective following a merger. Alternatively, a single corporate decision 
can eliminate existing routines and research methods. For example, following the hostile 
acquisition of Wellcome by Glaxo in 1995, management decided to close the key Beckenham 
research site. 
Acquisition of such new knowledge may be rejected and fail to flourish or it may prove slower 
and more difficult to assimilate than originally expected. This may be due to the lack of a 
suitable internal champion or because the new knowledge is more difficult to understand and 
assimilate. In some cases the “not invented here” (NIH) syndrome may even be a substantial 
barrier (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996), or selection may be skewed in favour of in-house 
research analogous to the “selfish gene theory” (Dawkins, 1989). 
The Genome as a Locus of Primary Activity 
The metaphor that genes are analogous to products provides an explanation as to how the 
collective weight of a company’s products act as a “corporate genome” channelling and 
prioritising the firm’s activities. Here, the importance or effective expression of the gene is 
directly related to two factors. The weight of the company’s sales derived from that product and 
the expectation for future growth attached to that product (see Figure 1). 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Individual Products Act as “Genes” 
Product “genes” clustered together in therapy areas act as complementary building blocks of 
market reputation, a company’s franchise within a specific market segment. This position is built 
through two dimensions, investment and knowledge accrued in research together with market 
reputation the result of accumulated sales and marketing activity upon defined customer groups. 
New research initiatives are more likely to build upon current research competences and 
accumulated knowledge because the time, cost and the learning curve necessary to build new 
areas of expertise is a marked barrier to entering new avenues. In addition, when a company has 
built a market reputation in a particular segment, licensing opportunities for complementary new 
products are likely to accrue to such visible areas of expertise and market success. 
Scale effects in research, development and marketing will therefore act to reinforce existing 
market positions that are grounded in past product decisions. Resources are also likely to accrue 
to projects linked to existing market success and will therefore differentially build upon 
sustained market positions. For example, Glaxo Smith Kline applied very considerable weight 
behind the launch of their combination product Seretide that builds upon the heritage and 
established franchise of their Allen & Hanburys division. 
Path dependent decisions will therefore stem from each successful product “gene” (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982); the stronger the franchise, the more entrenched the path. Decisions steeped in 
accumulated experience and market routines where product entry is predetermined by a set of 
previously successful market entry decisions and the accepted rules of engagement for that 
market. 
Such “genes” may be transferred through merger or acquisition, but the effect of individual 
genes or “blocks of complementary activities” may also be diluted through combination of the 
genomes of two companies. Here “merger indigestion” may occur in the event that the 
constituent product “genes” of the two constituent company genomes are not complementary, 
which can lead to confusion over market priorities, political infighting and the disruption of 
critical tacit routines associated with research, sales and marketing activities. For example, the 
merger of Sweden’s Pharmacia and Michigan’s Upjohn resulted in reductions in sales, profit 
concerns, and turf battles (George and Pearson, 2002). 
This is not the case if the two constituent genomes fit well together and complement market and 
research priorities. In this instance, the linking of such complementary product lines may be 
expected to lead to improved market position, a strengthening of the company’s market 
franchise, greater bargaining power with customers and operating efficiencies resulting from cost 
synergies as duplicate activities are eliminated. A favourable performance outcome may 
therefore be expected where the two companies’ strategies are compatible and a good strategic fit 
exists between the product lines of the merging companies. Thus, the application of the corporate 
genome model may provide an explanation as to why the expected improvement in research 
productivity and the application of scale failed to materialise in some pharmaceutical mergers, 
such as Glaxo Smith Kline or Aventis. 
An inappropriate merger and the resulting combination of two company genomes that do not fit 
well together may lead to confusion, changed competitive dynamics, and even a fracture of 
existing networks or alliance activities. These effects can result in a marked loss of productivity 
and a reduction of the original effectiveness of the individual firms. Transfer of knowledge may 
not therefore be complete as the dominant paradigm of one set of industrial routines may eclipse 
its rival during the period of integration. 
The activities and routines of the firm are thus conceptualised to align closely with the product 
“genes” where weight of influence and hence importance is driven by current value and the 
expectation of their relative potential. Such routines may be adapted as new complementary 
products are introduced or as market positions develop thus acting in broad agreement with the 
conception of dynamic emergent capabilities rather than static “time worn” competences 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
Following this logic, the research bedrock from which new product ideas spring is a mass of 
interdisciplinary competences developed over time that forms the unique “research bench” of 
that firm. The development of new capabilities is the ability to see such knowledge bases in a 
new perspective or through an alternative lens perhaps driven by recent market success or failure 
or fuelled by the application of new technologies to the existing “time worn” routines. 
Opportunities exposed by environmental change that each company may view independently 
from the perspective of their accumulation of research and market activities in related areas. 
Under conditions of market turbulence, the individual routines that relate to the product “genes” 
may be adjusted to take account of emerging opportunities. These actions constitute a firm’s 
adaptive response to market change and may in extreme conditions lead to a sharp change in 
corporate priorities. For example, the blacklisting of Roche anti-depressants by the U.K. 
Department of Health in 1985 constituted the bulk of that firm’s U.K. revenues and forced a 
rapid shift in corporate priorities. Under such drastic circumstances, corporate priorities and the 
attendant routines and processes associated with remaining products would therefore shift in 
relation to changes in product weighting and relative importance. Changes may also be triggered 
through the effect of external influences, such as shareholders, or a change in market 
opportunity
Eisenhardt and associates (2000) argued that whilst such routines and “elements of best practice” 
that constitute dynamic capability, work effectively during times of stability, they break down 
under more turbulent conditions and experiment replaces routine. However, this view is not 
always supported by evidence from the pharmaceutical industry for four reasons (Kwanghui, 
2004; Lee, 2003; Willoughby, 2004). First, because the bulk of corporate direction derives from 
older established products with a wealth of established interlinked routines that would be 
expected to resist such an experimental approach and the implied associated risk. Consider that 
after the merger of Astra and Zeneca, omeprazole still represents over 40% of combined Astra 
Zeneca revenue. Second, even in the event of dramatic market change, such as the loss of a 
major product, the observed corporate response has been one of retrenchment and resetting of 
priority based upon existing routines. Third, company new product launch routines invariably 
follow existing patterns of market behaviour. 
. 
Finally, the marketing routines of specific pharmaceutical sales-forces are finely tuned to the 
product priorities being delivered and represent one of the companies heaviest “organs of 
investment” where customer focus, type of message delivered and the means of delivery are all 
highly tailored. Attempting to change such established sales-force routines may be equivalent to 
turning a super-tanker as actions are strongly affected by experience, current routines and past 
successes or failures steeped in knowledge and experience within the therapy area. Routines 
aligned to specific customer-representative relationships. This may explain why ostensibly 
successful companies within one therapy area can find it very difficult to switch therapy areas 
with similar success. 
This point can be illustrated by the failure of Ciba Geigy (now Novartis) to market fomoterol a 
respiratory compound, when the company’s strength lay in anti-rheumatics and women’s health. 
Thus, in certain circumstances entrenched core competences reinforce and may indeed become 
core rigidities. This view accords with previous research (Rumelt, 1984) suggesting that firms 
are limited in their future options and hence restricted in changing their current market position 
by past decisions and experience. Accumulated knowledge both tacit and codified aligned with 
product associations that act independently and through complementary blocks in the form of a 
corporate genome. Some of these points are illustrated in the following example of competition 
between Astra and Glaxo in 1994. Note how both companies are strongly focused in a handful of 
sub-therapy areas a situation common within the pharmaceutical industry. 
Astra, in 1999, the top U.K. pharmaceutical company, competed in eight of the 16 therapy areas. 
In contrast, revenues of the second leading firm, Allen and Hanbury’s, were derived solely from 
respiratory products (group R), a genome similar in style to that of Beecham, a firm built on 
antibiotics (group J), most notably Penicillin (see Table 2). 
Examination of the corporate genome of Glaxo, Allen & Hanbury (an operating company of the 
Glaxo corporation) and Astra reveals why Glaxo and Astra were bitter rivals in 1994. Here, 
Losec and Zantac were top priorities for each company, resulting in 64.8 and 75.3 percent of 
total company revenues respectively. A similar situation existed with Pulmicort and Becotide, 
number two priorities for both companies and direct substitutes, as well as for Bricanyl and 
Ventolin, number three priorities and direct respiratory competitors (See Table 3). This explains 
why in 1994 rivalry between Glaxo and Astra eclipsed all other competitors and strategies were 
directed solely within this intense battle. 
Table 3.  
Astra and Glaxo as Intense Competitors 
1994 
 
Priority 
Rank for 
Both 
Companie
s 
 
Glaxo Labs 
 
Alien & Hanbury 
 
Astra 
  
Product
s 
Therap
y 
% 
of 
Sale
s 
Product
s 
Therap
y 
% 
of 
Sale
s 
Product
s 
Therap
y 
% 
of 
Sale
s 
 
1 A2B 75.3    1 A2B 64.8 1 
1 A4A 0.8    1 B3A 0.0  
1 C5A 0.0    5 C1B 0.1  
1 C7A 0.7    2 C1E 5.4  
1 D1A 0.2    1 C5A 0.3  
6 D7A 7.2    1 C7A 0.5  
4 D7B 0.8    1 C7B 0.2  
3 H2A 0.3    1 D4A 0.0  
4 J1D 2.4    1 J5A 0.0  
1 J7B 0.0    6 NIB 0.2  
1 N2C 12.3    1 N5A 0.0  
1 S1K 0.0    1 N5B 0.5  
   2 R1A 8.0 1 R1A 0.8  
   4 R3A 38.4 2 R3A 7.0 3 
      1 R3B 0.1  
   4 R3D 52.1 1 R3D 20.1 2 
   1 R3F 0.7 1 T2X 0.0  
   1 R6A 0.8     
Total 25   24   28    
 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
A central focus of company strategy is to satisfy the demands of shareholders. Expectations of 
future performance rest upon the company’s product portfolio and how it is leveraged in the 
marketplace. However, products do not work in isolation and past success builds market position 
that in turn creates and sustains future market opportunities, which in turn shape both the future 
performance expectations of the firm and subsequent new product decisions. 
The analogy of the corporate genome applied herein to the U.K. pharmaceutical industry offers a 
rich perspective on the strategic activity of a firm, one that also serves to integrate the strategic 
group and resource based perspectives. As such, products form the bedrock upon which 
corporate routines are focused with the twin aims of maximising return and building sustainable 
competitive advantage. Market performance results from the effective implementation of 
strategy where one of the key influences on management action is the expectation of the 
company’s more influential shareholders. The past activities of the firm and the existing and 
ongoing relationships with customers “hard-wire” the firms market responses where past success 
and established ways of working can both promote and constrain future performance. 
The corporate genome model provides the means of accounting for tacit routines, market 
reputation and existing relationships—all so critical for market success—when evaluating and 
classifying strategy. Shareholder expectation increasingly drives corporate management who 
shape their strategies in response to what the product portfolio offers and the shareholders 
expect. Hence, these strategies that we classify into strategic groups link back to individual 
product decisions and the resource base of the firm. Future studies could expand on the concept 
of the corporate genome by examining other industries. 
The rich detail of a firm’s resource base populates and provides the additional points of 
differentiation necessary to classify strategies accurately, both subtle and overt, and represent a 
strategic choice in a given industry setting. In the same way that the accuracy of a taxonomy of 
strategy described by strategic group membership depends upon the right degree of detail to 
populate the analysis, the resource based view of the firm is sterile without the link to realized 
strategy that stems from the application of the firms activities to effective revenue generation 
(i.e., product sales). This link is illustrated by the notion of strategic groups. 
In sum, the strategic group and resource based perspectives of the firm represent different but 
complementary perspectives on competitive strategies and performance. Strategic group theory 
provides a means to aggregate firms into meaningful groups based upon the degree of similarity 
between their strategies, effectively linking inputs and realized strategy in terms of firm’s 
activities. In contrast, focusing on resources and the elements that are combined in the crafting of 
strategies intended to meet performance objectives fosters an understanding of many of the 
micro processes of the firm so important in building competitive advantage. These two 
competing viewpoints both contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of 
competition. 
Any attempt at building on the merits of both the strategic group and resource based perspectives 
must account for the varying degrees of influence of both group factors and firm resources on 
performance (Roquebert, Phillips, and Westfall, 1996). The influence of strategic groups on 
performance appears to be greatest when businesses choose to adapt to existing conditions rather 
than attempt to influence them. Specifically, strategies that emphasize adaptation enhance 
industry’s role, whereas those that emphasize enactment minimize it. In industries where 
strategic groups may exist, businesses choose whether or not to join them. 
The industry and strategic group levels of analysis should not be discarded in an attempt to better 
comprehend the business strategy-performance relationship (Zahra and Pearce, 1990). Indeed, 
both levels—in concert with the firm level—contribute to an overall comprehension of 
organizational performance. For example, recent studies (e.g., Dooley, Fowle and Miller, 1996; 
and Miles, Snow and Sharfman, 1993) have concluded that high strategic heterogeneity 
positively influences the overall profitability of an industry. Although these investigations have 
occurred at the industry level of analysis, implications for the business level are clear. Simply 
stated, the strategy-performance relationship may be moderated by the strategies implemented by 
one’s competitors. Hence, industry-level studies such as these continue to increase the wealth of 
knowledge about individual firm strategies and performance. 
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